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Abstract
We show that in overlapping generations endogenous growth models
with uncertain lifetime, the introduction of government transfers always
increases economic growth by crowding out the private annuity market
and increasing accidental bequests. In particular, if the government im-
poses a flat-rate consumption tax (which is neutral to the consumption-
saving margin), uses part of the tax revenue for unproductive purposes,
and rebates the rest equally across agents as a lump-sum transfer, the
economy grows faster and improves the welfare of future generations.
Keywords: annuity, endogenous growth, overlapping generations, re-
distribution
JEL classification: D58, E21, H20, H21, O41.
1 Introduction
Suppose that the government imposes some tax, uses part of the tax revenue
for unproductive purposes, and rebates the rest to agents. Would this policy
increase or decrease economic growth? Intuition tells us that the growth rate
will decrease, since resources are wasted after all. In this paper, we show that
this intuition is not generally correct: in perpetual youth models, if the tax
does not directly affect growth (which is true for flat-rate consumption tax),
then this redistribution policy unambiguously increases economic growth by
crowding out the private annuity market and increasing accidental bequests.
This paper studies the effect of annuities and transfers on economic growth
in perpetual youth models (Yaari, 1965; Blanchard, 1985), where agents die at a
constant rate and new agents are born at the same rate. We show that perpetual
youth models with annuities have three forces that modify economic growth
relative to the benchmark economy with infinitely-lived agents: (i) impatience
(−), (ii) effective risk-free rate (+), and (iii) accidental bequests (−), where (±)
denote the positive or negative effect on growth. The first negative effect always
dominates the second positive effect, and hence the growth rate unambiguously
decreases in perpetual youth models relative to the benchmark case, which is
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similar to the well-known result that the steady state capital is lower in perpetual
youth models with decreasing returns to scale (Blanchard, 1985). However,
when agents receive government transfers in this economy, it reduces the third
negative effect while leaving the first two effects unchanged. Consequently, the
introduction of government transfers in perpetual youth models unambiguously
increases economic growth.
The intuition for this somewhat surprising result is as follows. Since agents
die at a constant rate δ > 0, in the absence of government transfers, agents
pledge their capital (wealth) to insurance companies to obtain annuities at pre-
mium δ. In the presence of transfers, part of the agents’ wealth is the “gov-
ernment bond” (a claim to future transfers), but because the transfer is given
only to agents that are alive, this government bond is not pledgeable to insur-
ance companies. Provided that the tax instruments to finance the transfers do
not directly affect growth, the introduction of government transfers crowds out
the private annuity market, increases accidental bequests, and leads to higher
economic growth. This is the case when we consider a flat-rate consumption
tax.
This paper is related to two strands of literature. The first is the large liter-
ature on taxation and growth. In this literature, researchers typically consider
dynamic models that feature some inefficiencies such as externalities, public
goods, or incomplete markets, and study the effect of taxation on growth and
welfare. Examples are human capital formation (Lucas, 1988; King and Rebelo,
1993), provision of productive public goods (Barro, 1990; Jones et al., 1993;
Hatfield, 2015), saving behavior under uninsured idiosyncratic risk (Aiyagari,
1994; Angeletos, 2007), bequest motive (Ihori, 2001), and political economy
(Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2016), among others.1 However, sources of inefficien-
cies are not necessary to make the study of taxation on growth interesting. For
example, Jones and Manuelli (1992) show that in an overlapping generations
model with finite lives and convex technologies, (i) the consumption path in a
laissez-faire economy is always bounded, but (ii) taxing the old and subsidizing
the young may sustain growth. The intuition is that taxing the old makes future
consumption more expensive and induces the young to save. Compared to this
literature, our results are complementary since we only consider flat-rate con-
sumption tax (with a single good), which does not directly affect growth since
it is neutral to the consumption-saving margin (Stokey and Rebelo, 1995).2
Our paper is also related to the literature that employs perpetual youth mod-
els (Yaari, 1965; Blanchard, 1985), which are convenient for studying intergener-
ational issues in a tractable way and introducing stationarity in heterogeneous-
agent models. Recent applications are asset pricing (Gaˆrleanu et al., 2012;
Gaˆrleanu and Panageas, 2015), retirement (Prettner and Canning, 2014), and
power laws in income and wealth distributions (Toda, 2014; Toda and Walsh,
2015; Benhabib et al., 2016; Gabaix et al., 2016), among others. Although
several papers have studied the growth effects of taxation and/or annuities in
perpetual youth models,3 our mechanism that government transfers increase
1Although our paper is purely theoretical, for empirical evidence on the relation between
taxation and growth, see for example Engen and Skinner (1996) and Lee and Gordon (2005).
2Other forms of taxes may mechanically affect growth by intervening in the intra- and
intertemporal choice, such as differential tax rates on production factors (Easterly, 1993) or
capital income taxation (Uhlig and Yanagawa, 1996).
3See, for example, Hu (1999), Reinhart (1999), Heijdra and Ligthart (2000), Hansen and
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growth by crowding out the annuity market does not seem to be known. The
closest result to ours is Petrucci (2002), who shows that consumption tax and re-
bates increase economic growth in perpetual youth models. However, his model
contains special features such as production externality, log utility, and perfect
annuity market, so it is not clear whether the results are general. Most impor-
tantly, Petrucci (2002) does not identify the key mechanism that government
transfers increase growth by crowding out the annuity market.
2 Growth in perpetual youth models
In this section we show how annuities and transfers affect economic growth
in perpetual youth models. We first consider the benchmark economy with
infinitely-lived agents, and then introduce annuities and transfers when agents
enter/exit the economy.
2.1 Benchmark economy
The model is a continuous-time endogenous growth model (AK model) with a
continuum of agents and a government. At time t = 0, there is a continuum
of identical, infinitely-lived agents with mass 1, each endowed with one unit of
capital.
Agents have identical, additively separable utility function with constant
elasticity of substitution
Ut =
∫ ∞
0
e−βs
c
1−1/ε
t+s
1− 1/ε ds, (2.1)
where β > 0 is the time preference rate, ε > 0 is the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution, and ct is consumption at time t. As usual, the case ε = 1
corresponds to the log utility.
Capital can be either consumed or invested in a saving technology that yields
an exogenous, risk-free return µ.4 Alternatively, we can think of a small open
economy that has access to a risk-free asset with elastic supply, whose rate is set
by international investors. Thus an agent’s objective is to maximize the utility
(2.1) subject to the budget constraint
dwt = (µwt − ct) dt, (2.2)
where wt is wealth. This problem is a standard Merton (1971)-type optimal
consumption-saving problem. The optimal consumption rule is ct = m0wt,
5
where the marginal propensity to consume (m0) is given by
m0 = εβ + (1− ε)µ. (2.3)
I˙mrohorog˘lu (2008), Heijdra and Mierau (2010, 2012), and Heijdra et al. (2014).
4This assumption is only for simplicity. The same results obtain with stochastic returns.
If capital evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion with volatility σ, all results go
through by changing µ to µ − γσ2
2
, where γ > 0 is the relative risk aversion of the agents.
In that case one needs to consider the continuous-time analogue of the Epstein-Zin utility
(Svensson, 1989; Duffie and Epstein, 1992).
5In order for this to be the solution, we need the parameter restriction εβ + (1− ε)µ > 0.
Otherwise, the transversality condition limt→∞ e−βtUt = 0 is violated, and there is no solu-
tion. The transversality condition is sufficient for optimality. See, for example, the discussion
of the verification theorem in Chang (2004, pp. 122–125).
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The growth rate of the individual wealth α0 (as well as the growth rate of
aggregate wealth g0 since it is a representative-agent model) is given by
α0 = g0 = µ−m0 = ε(µ− β). (2.4)
As is well known, whether the economy grows or shrinks over time depends on
whether or not the interest rate µ exceeds the time preference rate β.
2.2 Overlapping generations economy with annuities
Next, instead of assuming infinitely-lived agents, suppose that agents are born
and die at constant Poisson rate δ > 0, as in Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985).
In addition to the agents, there are perfectly competitive insurance companies
that offer annuities. Since agents die at a constant rate δ, the insurance premium
is also δ. This means that while agents are alive, for each unit of annuity contract
held, the agents receive δ∆t during a small time interval of length ∆t. When
they die, they pay 1 to the annuity company, which breaks even.
To see how the introduction of annuities affects economic growth, it is con-
venient to consider an economy with imperfect annuities: following Hansen and
I˙mrohorog˘lu (2008), agents can only pledge a fraction 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 of their capital
for the annuity contracts. When an agent dies, his heir inherits the remaining
fraction 1− λ.
The solution to the individual problem is similar to the benchmark case.
Since agents die at rate δ > 0, it increases the effective discount factor from β
to β + δ. Since agents can receive annuities at rate δ on fraction of wealth λ,
the effective risk-free rate faced by individuals becomes µ + δλ. By (2.3) and
(2.4), the propensity to consume out of wealth and the individual growth rate
become
m1 = ε(β + δ) + (1− ε)(µ+ δλ) = m0 + εδ(1− λ) + δλ, (2.5a)
α1 = ε(µ+ δλ− β − δ) = α0 − εδ(1− λ), (2.5b)
respectively.
To derive the growth rate of the aggregate economy, consider what happens
to an agent with wealth wt between a short time period ∆t. If the agent survives
(which occurs with probability 1 − δ∆t), then the wealth grows at rate α1
in (2.5b), so it becomes (1 + α1∆t)wt. If the agent dies (which occurs with
probability δ∆t), according to the annuity contract λwt will go to the insurance
company, which is then distributed among the surviving agents as annuities.
The heir inherits the remaining capital (1 − λ)wt. Hence by accounting we
obtain
W + ∆W = (1− δ∆t)(1 + α1∆t)W︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate wealth of surviving agents
+ δ∆t(1− λ)Wt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate wealth of newborn agents
= (1 + α1∆t)W − δλW∆t+ higher order terms. (2.6)
Subtracting W from both sides and letting ∆t→ 0, the aggregate wealth evolves
according to
dW = (α1 − δλ)W dt.
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Therefore the growth rate of aggregate wealth (and hence all aggregate variables)
is
g1 = α1 − δλ = α0 − εδ(1− λ)− δλ, (2.7)
where α0, α1 are given by (2.4) and (2.5b), respectively.
Since ε, δ > 0 and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, we immediately obtain the following result.
Proposition 1. In perpetual youth models, the growth rate of the economy is
unambiguously lower than the benchmark economy with infinitely-lived agents.
Although this result is well known (for example, with decreasing returns to
scale, Blanchard (1985) shows that the steady state capital is lower in perpetual
youth models), it is useful to highlight the forces contributing to this result.
There are essentially three factors. First, in perpetual youth models, agents
become more impatient (β ↗ β + δ) and increase the propensity to consume
(reduce savings), which decreases growth. Second, in the presence of annuities,
agents face a higher effective risk-free rate (µ↗ µ+δλ), which increases growth.
The first effect always dominates the second, since the first is proportional to
δ, while the second is proportional to δλ, where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. These two effects
explain the term −εδ(1 − λ) ≤ 0 in (2.7).6 Finally, there is a third factor,
accidental bequests. As is clear from (2.6), the last term in (2.7) comes from
the initial wealth of newborn agents, which is proportional to δ(1 − λ). The
term −δλ ≤ 0 can thus be interpreted as the reduction of accidental bequests
due to annuities.
Note that while the growth rate decreases in perpetual youth models relative
to the benchmark economy with infinitely-lived agents, how the growth rate
changes with respect to the annuity participation rate λ is ambiguous. To see
this, by (2.7) we obtain
g1 = α0 − εδ − (1− ε)δλ,
so increasing annuity participation λ increases (decreases) growth if ε > 1 (ε <
1). With log utility (ε = 1), the annuity participation does not affect economic
growth.
2.3 OLG economy with annuities and transfers
Finally, we introduce a government to the model. Suppose that the government
gives a lump-sum transfer Tt to all agents that are alive at time t. For now, it
does not matter how the transfer is financed. All we need is that the transfer
Tt is proportional to the aggregate wealth Wt, which grows at rate g = g2 in
equilibrium.
Letting kt be the capital of a typical agent, the individual budget constraint
is
dkt = (µ+ δλ)kt dt− ct dt+ Tt dt. (2.8)
Let r = µ+ δλ be the effective risk-free rate and
bt =
∫ ∞
0
Tt+se
−rs ds =
∫ ∞
0
Tte
gse−rs ds =
Tt
r − g (2.9)
6Note that with perfect annuity (λ = 1), as is often assumed in the literature, these two
effects exactly cancel out (Barro and Friedman, 1977).
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be the present value of future transfers at time t, which also grows at rate g.
bt can be interpreted as a “government bond”, which pays out dividend Tt at
time t. Let wt = kt + bt be the effective wealth of an agent. By the individual
budget constraint (2.8), we obtain
dwt = dkt + dbt = rkt dt− ct dt+ Tt dt+ dbt
= rkt dt− ct dt+ (r − g)bt dt+ gbt dt
= rwt dt− ct dt, (2.10)
where we have used (2.9) and wt = kt + bt. Note that this equation is the
same as (2.2) except that µ is replaced by r = µ+ δλ. Therefore the individual
decision rule is the same as in (2.5a), and the individual growth rate α2 equals
α1 in (2.5b).
However, the introduction of government transfers does affect aggregate
growth. The reason is because the aggregate wealth is not just capital but
also contains the government bond (present value of future transfers, bt). While
capital can be pledged to obtain annuities, the government bond cannot, be-
cause the transfer Tt is given only to agents that are alive at time t. Essentially,
the annuity participation is λ for capital but 0 for the government bond. Thus,
the aggregate wealth of newborn agents in (2.6) becomes
δ∆t((1− λ)Kt + bt) = δ∆t(1− λθ)Wt, (2.11)
where θ = K/W is the capital-wealth ratio. Therefore, repeating the argument
to derive (2.7), the growth rate of aggregate wealth (and hence all aggregate
variables) with transfers is
g2 = α2 − δλθ = α0 − εδ(1− λ)− δλθ. (2.12)
Comparing (2.7) and (2.12), it follows that
g2 − g1 = δλ(1− θ) ≥ 0
since the government bond is in net positive supply (bt ≥ 0 implies θ = K/W ≤
1). In summary, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2. In perpetual youth models, other things being equal, the intro-
duction of government transfers increases the aggregate growth rate.
An immediate corollary is that lump-sum taxes in perpetual youth models
decrease aggregate growth.
The intuition for this somewhat surprising result is as follows. As discussed
before, in perpetual youth models with annuities, there are three forces that
affect economic growth, (i) increased impatience (−εδ in (2.12)), (ii) increased
effective risk-free rate (+εδλ in (2.12)), and (iii) reduction of accidental bequests
(−δλθ in (2.12)). The first two effects are in total always negative, and they
do not depend on government transfers since the time preference rate (β + δ)
is exogenous and the effective risk-free rate (µ+ δλ) depends only on the tech-
nology and the annuity participation rate, which are exogenous in our setting.
However, the government transfer does affect accidental bequests. With gov-
ernment transfers, part of agents’ wealth is in the form of government bond,
which cannot be pledged for annuities. Therefore, government transfers crowd
out the annuity market, which increase accidental bequests and hence economic
growth.
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3 Example: consumption tax and rebates
In the previous section, we showed that in perpetual youth models with an-
nuities, the introduction of government transfers increases economic growth.
However, we did not specify how the transfers were financed but took them as
given. In this section, we show in a (closed economy) general equilibrium model
that if the transfers are financed by a flat-rate consumption tax, all the results
go through.
3.1 Model
Consider the AK model with a continuum of agents as before. The government
imposes a flat-rate tax on consumption at rate τ ≥ 0. The government uses
part of the tax revenue for unproductive purposes, which does not affect the
utility of any agent. Only fraction 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1 of the revenue will remain, and
the government redistributes it as lump-sum transfers to all existing agents.
Letting kt be the capital of a typical agent and Tt be the government transfer
to the agents, the individual budget constraint is
dkt = (µ+ δλ)kt dt− (1 + τ)ct dt+ Tt dt. (3.1)
Note that (3.1) is identical to (2.8), except that consumption is taxed at rate
τ . Let Ct be the aggregate consumption. Since consumption is taxed at rate
τ and the government rebates fraction κ of the tax revenue to the agents, the
government budget constraint is
Tt = κτCt. (3.2)
An equilibrium is defined by an individual consumption rule {ct} and an ag-
gregate consumption process {Ct} such that (i) given the transfer Tt, agents
maximize utility subject to the individual budget constraint (3.1), (ii) the gov-
ernment budget constraint (3.2) holds, and (iii) individual consumption {ct}
and aggregate consumption {Ct} are consistent.
3.2 Equilibrium
To characterize the equilibrium, we first solve the individual problem. Solv-
ing a Merton (1971)-type optimal consumption-saving problem as before, the
marginal propensity to consume and the individual growth rate are given by
m =
1
1 + τ
(ε(β + δ) + (1− ε)(µ+ δλ)) = m2
1 + τ
, (3.3a)
α = ε(µ+ δλ− β − δ) = α2. (3.3b)
Note from (3.3a) that in the presence of consumption tax, agents cut consump-
tion proportionally. As a result, consumption expenditures are unchanged, and
so is the wealth growth rate (3.3b). As is well-known, consumption tax is neu-
tral to the intertemporal choice. This point is important because it shows that
our results are not driven by interventions in the consumption-saving margin.
Next, we characterize the growth rate g of aggregate variables by calculating
the tax transfer in two ways. By the optimal consumption rule (3.3a), the
aggregate consumption is given by Ct =
m2
1+τWt, where
m2 = ε(β + δ) + (1− ε)(µ+ δλ).
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By the government budget constraint (3.2), the transfer is
Tt = κτCt =
τ
1 + τ
κm2Wt.
On the other hand, by the definition of the present value of future transfers
(2.9) and the capital-wealth ratio, we have
Tt = (r − g)bt = (r − g)(1− θ)Wt,
where r = µ + δλ is the effective risk-free rate and g = α2 − δλθ is given by
(2.12). Since by the individual budget constraint we have α = r−m2, it follows
that
(r − (r −m2 − δλθ))(1− θ) = τ
1 + τ
κm2
⇐⇒ δλθ(1− θ) +m2
(
1− τ
1 + τ
κ− θ
)
= 0. (3.4)
Since δ, λ > 0 are exogenous, the aggregate growth rate g in (2.12) entirely
depends on the capital-wealth ratio θ. Furthermore, g is decreasing in θ. Our
main result is as follows.
Proposition 3. Suppose that λ, κ > 0, so agents have access to annuities
and the government redistributes at least some of the tax revenue. Assume
m2 := ε(β+ δ) + (1− ε)(µ+ δλ) > 0, so a solution to the optimal consumption-
saving problem exists. Then the followings are true.
1. The equilibrium capital-wealth ratio θ is the unique solution in (0, 1) to
the quadratic equation (3.4).
2. The equilibrium capital-wealth ratio θ is decreasing in the tax rate τ ; the
economic growth rate (2.12) is increasing in the tax rate τ .
Proof. To show that 0 < θ < 1 is unique, let
f(x, q) = δλx(1− x) +m2(1− κq − x),
where q = τ1+τ < 1. Since κ ≤ 1, we have f(0, q) = m2(1 − κq) > 0. Since
f is quadratic and concave in x, it follows that f(x, q) = 0 has one positive
solution θ and one negative solution. Since f(1, q) = −m2κq < 0, it follows that
θ ∈ (0, 1) is unique.
Since q is increasing in τ , to show that θ is decreasing in τ , it suffices to show
that θ is decreasing in q. Since f is quadratic in x, f(0, q) > 0, f(1, q) < 0,
and f(θ, q) = 0, it follows that f(x, q) changes sign from positive to negative
at x = θ. Therefore ∂f∂x (θ, q) < 0. Since ∂f/∂q = −m2κ < 0, by the implicit
function theorem we have dθ/dq = −(∂f/∂q)/(∂f/∂x) < 0.
The mechanism for this “paradoxical economic growth” is as follows. By
Proposition 2, in perpetual youth models with annuities, the introduction of
government transfers increases economic growth by crowding out the annuity
market and increasing accidental bequests. Since consumption tax does not
affect the intertemporal choice, government transfers financed by a consumption
tax unambiguously increases economic growth.
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Is this paradoxical growth quantitatively important? To answer this question
note that since 0 < θ < 1 and δ, λ,m2 > 0, in order for (3.4) to hold we need
θ > 1 − τ1+τ κ. Since from (3.4) we have θ → 1 as τ → 0, the range of θ spans
an interval of at most length τ1+τ κ. Since the aggregate growth rate g in (2.12)
contains the term δλθ, it follows that the economic growth rate increases by no
more than
δ
τ
1 + τ
λκ
when the tax rate changes from 0 to τ , independent of the preference parameters.
Thus even with overly optimistic estimates of δ = 1/50 (average life expectancy
of 50 years), τ = 1/4 (25% consumption tax), λ = 1/2 (50% participation in the
annuity market), and κ = 1 (100% tax rebate), the upper bound of the growth
effect is only 0.2 percentage points. With more realistic numbers like δ = 1/80,
τ = 1/10, λ = 1/4, and κ = 1/4, the upper bound is 0.007 percentage points,
which is quite small.
3.3 Welfare
Finally, in this section we address the welfare implications of the above tax
and transfer policy. Because agents receive annuities (sell life insurance), each
time an agent dies, his heir inherits only part of the parent’s wealth. There-
fore dynasties that experienced fewer turnovers become relatively richer, which
complicates the welfare analysis. To avoid this issue, in this section we assume
that the government imposes a 100% estate tax to all agents and distributes
this tax revenue across all newborn agents.7 By doing so, the initial wealth of
a newborn agent depends only on the aggregate wealth at that point and not
on the parent’s wealth.
Let wt be the wealth of a typical agent alive at time t. By solving the op-
timal consumption-saving problem, we can show that the (undiscounted) value
function of the agent is
Ut =
1
1− 1/ε
(
a
1 + τ
wt
)1−1/ε
,
where
a = (β + δ)
1
1−1/ε (ε(β + δ) + (1− ε)(µ+ δλ)) 11−ε .
Since a depends only on exogenous parameters, the welfare of an agent can be
evaluated by wt1+τ in consumption equivalent.
Let Kt,Wt be the aggregate capital and wealth at time t. Without loss of
generality, we may normalized K0 = 1. Since K/W = θ, the welfare of agents
alive at t = 0 is
V0 =
W0
1 + τ
=
1
(1 + τ)θ
. (3.5)
By (2.11), the initial wealth of an agent born at time t > 0 is (1 − λθ)Wt.
Therefore the welfare of this agent is
Vt =
(1− λθ)Wt
1 + τ
=
1− λθ
(1 + τ)θ
egt, (3.6)
7This assumption is maintained in other papers, for example Hu (1999).
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where g is the growth rate of the economy given by g2 in (2.12). By Proposition
3, the growth rate g is increasing in the consumption tax rate τ . Since egt grows
exponentially in t while 1−λθ(1+τ)θ is constant, it follows that the tax/transfer policy
unambiguously benefits agents that are born in the sufficiently distant future.
However, the following proposition shows that the initial generation is always
hurt from the tax/transfer policy.
Proposition 4. The denominator in (3.5), (1 + τ)θ, is increasing in τ , so
raising the consumption tax rate decreases the welfare of the initial generation.
Proof. Let y = (1 + τ)θ. Multiplying (3.4) by (1 + τ)2, y is the solution in
(0, 1 + τ) to the quadratic equation
F (y, τ) = δλy(1 + τ − y) +m2(1 + τ)(1 + τ − τκ− y) = 0. (3.7)
As in the proof of Proposition 3, we obtain ∂F/∂y < 0. Differentiating (3.7)
with respect to τ , we obtain
∂F
∂τ
= δλy +m2((1 + τ − τκ− y) + (1 + τ)(1− κ))
= δλy − δλy 1 + τ − y
1 + τ
+m2(1 + τ)(1− κ)
=
δλy2
1 + τ
+m2(1 + τ)(1− κ) > 0,
where we have used (3.7) in the second equality. By the implicit function theo-
rem, we obtain dy/dτ = −(∂F/∂τ)/(∂F/∂y) > 0.
As a numerical example, suppose that β = 0.05 (5% discounting), ε = 0.5,
µ = 0.1 (10% investment return), δ = 1/50 (average lifespan 50 years), λ = 0.5
(50% participation in annuity), and κ = 0.5 (50% tax rebate). Figure 1 shows
the results when the consumption tax rate changes from 0% to 100%.
Figure 1a shows the aggregate growth rate of the economy. Consistent
with Proposition 3, the growth rate is monotonically increasing in the tax rate,
though the magnitudes are quite small. Figure 1b shows the welfare criterion
(3.5) of the initial generation. Consistent with Proposition 4, the initial gener-
ation is hurt by the tax/transfer policy. The welfare loss is quite large: with
20% consumption tax, the initial generation loses about 10% in consumption
equivalent. Because the economy grows faster under the tax/transfer policy,
the generations in the distant enough future gain in terms of welfare. Figure 1c
shows the generation that is indifferent between the tax/transfer policy and no
tax, which is computed by equating (3.6) to the value corresponding to τ = 0.
With 20% consumption tax, it takes about 40 years to break even.
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